The war in Ukraine: history of relationship between religious and civil powers

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by Giovanni Codevilla*

1. Premise

To analyse Kirill’s position on the war unleashed by Putin against Ukraine, it is necessary to recall some of the stages that mark the evolution of the relationship between religious and civil power in the history of Russia. The original principle of the harmony of the two powers, enunciated in Justinian’s sixth Novel and based on their harmonic collaboration, is soon abandoned in favour of the pre-eminence of the Grand Prince over the metropolitans, who, if they do not obey the civil authority, are replaced without hesitation, if not killed, as happened to the Metropolitan of Moscow Philipp II (Količev), strangled on the order of Ivan IV – known as the Terrible – in his monastic cell on December 23, 1569.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century there were two opposing ideas. The first, promoted by the monk Joseph Volotsky, igumen of Volokolamsk, preached an absolute legitimacy of the ecclesiastical property and an absolute firmness in condemning heresies and heretics, in full agreement with the secular authorities. The second, supported by Nil Sorskij and his followers – called non-owners (nestjžateli) – preached the exercise of charity towards heretics, the poverty of the Church and its independence from the secular sovereigns. In the sobor (Council) convened in 1503 the theses of Joseph prevailed, and the subordination of spiritual power to temporal power grew over time, even though the hegumen of Volokolamsk had affirmed that no obedience was owed to an unjust sovereign.

This distinction between a «just» and an «unjust» secular power was soon forgotten, and the arbitrary interpretation of Joseph’s thought is considered the theocratic foundation of autocracy. The affirmation of the superior power of the Grand Prince was also consolidated by the idea of making Moscow the Third Rome, enunciated at the beginning of the 16th century by the monk Filofej (1465ca.-1542), igumen of the Spaso-Eleazarov monastery of Elizarovo in the Pskov region, who was a follower of Joseph of Volokolamsk. In a letter that Filofej addressed to the Grand Prince of Moscow Vasily III Ivanovich (1505-1533), after defining him as the «light of Orthodoxy, Christian czar and lord of all, who holds the reins of all great and holy Russia, of the Mother of the Churches, of the ecumenical, universal and apostolic Church our most pure Lady Mother of God and of her venerable and glorious Assumption, of the Church that today shines in place of those of Rome and Constantinople» he writes: «[Orthodoxy] has fled again, in the third Rome, or in the new, great Rus’ […] Observe, oh Sovereign, how all the Christian kingdoms have come together in your one [kingdom], how two Romes have fallen, while the third stands, and there will not be a fourth one, your Christian kingdom will not pass to anyone else. In the whole world under the sky, you are the only King for Christians».

In this sense, Moscow and Muscovy replace Byzantium as the centre of the Christian ecumene and Moscow affirms its leading role in the Christian world. The translatio imperii was accompanied by the translatio fidei.

The detachment of Moscow from Constantinople will become definitive with the recognition of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1589, obtained by Boris Godunov in violation of canonical norms, given that the appointment of Iona as Metropolitan of Moscow had not received the consent of Constantinople, while the union of the Churches had been approved by the Council of Ferrara-Florence (1439), accepted by Constantinople but rejected by Moscow.

So, the fracture between Moscow and Byzantium was born before 1500 and was only worsened after the Muslim conquest of Constantinople (1543).

After the creation of the new patriarchal see in Moscow, the ecumenical patriarch visited the Polish Lithuanian Confederation and proposed the establishment of a patriarchate also in Kyiv. This project did not go through, but it embodied the aspirations of the Ruthenian Orthodox to be independent from Moscow, which resulted in its union with Rome as well as the birth of the Greek-Catholic Church, propitiated by the Jesuits, and favoured by the King of Poland. It is important to remember that from the middle of the 14th century, Kyiv was part of the Rzeczpospolita, together with the lands of Belarus and Ukraine, a region where was possible to breathe a very different cultural air than that of Muscovy. As an example, Kostyantyn Vasyl – the Prince of Ostroh (Ostrih), called the Unconroned King of Ukraine, who was a staunch defender of Orthodoxy – in 1576 founded the first Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy of Ruthenia, inspired by the model of the Jesuit institutes. In 1632, this School will merge with the School of the Confraternity of the Epiphany of Kyiv, founded in 1615, giving life to the Kyiv College. 

In 1694, after the return of Ukraine to Russia sanctioned by the peace of Andrusovo – stipulated at the end of the Russo-Polish war in 1667 – the College will become the Kyiv Academy, based in the Epiphany monastery, alma mater of higher education of the whole Slavic Orthodox area.

It is worth mentioning here the importance of the contribution given in all the fields of the arts, sciences, and culture by Ivan Stepanovyč Mazepa (1639-1709), Hetman of the Cossack State (1687-1709), to whom we owe the conceptual elaboration of Ukraine as an independent res publica, whose future would depend on its equidistance from Poland and Russia, contrasting Ukrainian independence with Russian absolutism. So, we can see how Russia and Ukraine, despite having a common root in the baptism of Rus’ in 988, are not identical realities, and this is confirmed by the linguistic difference. 

The presence in Ukraine of a significant number of Russian-speaking Ukrainians depends on the forced migrations of the Stalinist period and on the policy of forced Russification which favoured the formation of mixed families, composed of Russian and Ukrainian speakers. Moreover, the spread of the Ukrainian language was hindered starting with Peter the Great and subsequent sovereigns until the fall of the Tsarist empire and since the beginning of the 1930s, when the short period of Ukrainization initiated by the Bolsheviks ended to make room for the forced Russification of Ukraine.


During Soviet rule, Russia and Ukraine were divided by the great famine, generated by the Stalinist policy which fostered the export of cereals to have the economic means for the modernization of agricultural machinery. The Holodomor was terrible, in some part overcome by cannibalism. So, Russia and Ukraine are not really brothers or sisters. The implosion of the Soviet Union and the birth of Ukraine as an independent state sharpened the differences between the two countries, giving way to Putin’s Ukrainophobia, also determined by the Ukrainian aspiration to full political and cultural independence. This process underwent a strong acceleration after the ousting of the pro-Russian Yanukovič regime, the Maidan revolution, and the beginning of armed confrontation in the lands of Donbass (Luhansk and Donetsk) supported by Russia.
The invasion that began on February 24, 2022, should be read as a sign of continuity in the Russian policy of repressing Kyiv’s aspirations for independence and achieving full submission of the country to Russia.

2. The attitude of the Churches in relation to the war unleashed by Moscow

In the Eastern Slavic world, the harmony between Sacerdotium and Imperium lasted for a very short historical period, and precisely at the time of the patriarch Philaret (Fëdor Nikitič Romanov, 1619-1633) and his son, Tsar Michail Fëdorovič Romanov (1613-1645), and during the reign of Alexei Michajlovič (1645-1676).
With the abolition of the Patriarchate in 1721 and its replacement by the governing Holy Synod, made up of ecclesiastics and lay people pleasing to the sovereign, Peter the Great boasts an absolute and exclusive ius territori and proclaims himself custos utriusque tabulae, i.e. guardian of the precepts relating to duties towards God and towards men. This relationship of subordination of the Church to the State continues, albeit with different nuances, for two centuries and becomes particular violent during the Bolshevik regime, that declared a war against religion to bring about its definitive disappearance.
After the implosion of the Soviet Union, a more apparent than real symphony is re-established between the State and the Church. The latter renounced its independence to enjoy the generous economic benefits guaranteed by the civil authorities. As a result, a judicial system is recreated and the ancient synallagm is re-proposed which sees the State as a defensor fidei and the Church as a source of legitimation of the power of the State. 


In other words, the Church does not claim its autonomy and agrees to perform an ancillary function: the attitude of Patriarch Kirill (Gundjaev) and his relationship with political power are therefore the rule, and not an exception. However, it cannot be said that Kirill’s position in relation to the war in Ukraine is shared by the entire Russian Orthodox Church and by the other Orthodox Churches.
In fact, if the leaders of Russian Orthodoxy slavishly follow Kirill’s positions and sometimes surpass them for obsequiousness, the statements of the other Churches present in Ukraine are quite different. Thus, Onufrij (Berezovsky) – who is the Metropolitan of Kyiv and of all Ukraine, so the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (of the Moscow Patriarchate), that is the largest among the Orthodox Churches present in Ukraine – did not hesitate to openly distance himself from his patriarch. He has always been loyal to Kirill, even opposing the recognition of the Ukrainian autocephalous Orthodox Church, but the day before the armed invasion of the country, he stated: «the problem has arrived. Unfortunately, Russia has initiated military action against Ukraine, and at this fateful moment I urge you not to panic, to be courageous and to show love for your homeland and for each other […]. At this tragic time, we offer special love and support to our soldiers who stand guard, protect, and defend our land and our people. May God bless them and protect them! Defending the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, we appeal to the President of Russia and ask for an immediate end to the fratricidal war».

After the invasion of the Russian army in numerous Ukrainian eparchies belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate (Sumy, Žytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Vladimir-Volynsk, Vinnica and Mukačevo), at the request of their respective bishops, the celebrants refuse to commemorate the patriarch during the liturgy, as do the monks of the ancient Caves Lavra of Kiev, where the monasticism of Rus’ was born, and this means that a large majority of this Church renounces the authority of the patriarch of Moscow, from whom it is spiritually detached, even if not (yet) canonically. What happened in 1927 is therefore repeated, when following the Declaration of Fidelity to the Soviet regime signed by Metropolitan and future Patriarch Sergij (Stragorodskij) the bishops and priests of the Russian Orthodox Church were divided between commemorating and non-commemorating (pominajuščie and nepominajuščie) depending on whether they accepted or refused to mention the name of the metropolitan in the Divine liturgy.

Patriarch Kirill reacted in an extremely irritated way, writing on March 2 to Bishop Evlogy of Sumy of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate: «the cessation of the commemoration of the Primate of the Church, not because of doctrinal or canonical errors, or disappointments, but because of the discrepancy with certain opinions and political preferences, it is a schism, for which whoever commits it will answer before God, not only in the age to come, but also in the present».

Metropolitan Onufrij, who rarely spoke out against the war that began in 2014 between Kyiv and the Russian separatists of Donbass, in criticizing the Russian aggression against Ukraine uses the biblical image of Cain: «The Ukrainian and Russian peoples came out of the baptismal source of the Dnieper, and the war between these peoples is a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his brother out of envy. Such a war has no justification either with God or with men».

For his part, the synod of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, nominally belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate, warns that: «if the bloodshed is not stopped, the abyss between our peoples could remain forever».

Because of Kirill’s pro-Putin attitude, reduced by the Russian president to the rank of minister of religion, and his refusal to condemn the war against Ukraine, we are witnessing an abandonment of the Church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate. With Metropolitan Onufri’s clear stance against the war, 700 parishes of the patriarchate of Moscow have passed to the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. This emigration of the faithful appears more significant if we consider that in terms of the number of practitioners the Ukrainian Orthodox Church constitutes half of the Russian Orthodox Church, whose prestige in the Orthodox world suffers serious damage.

This transmigration of the faithful will favour the aggregation of the Orthodox into a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which the Greek-Catholic Church may perhaps approach, feeling how tepid its support is by Rome, especially interested as it is in interreligious dialogue with the Orthodox.

Kirill’s utterances are not shared by the Orthodox Churches abroad: so the Orthodox parish in the Netherlands has decided to withdraw from the jurisdiction of Moscow and the Metropolitan of Tallinn Evgenij (Rešetnikov), primate of the Estonian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, has signed a declaration of strong condemnation of the war in Ukraine which is a prelude to a detachment from Moscow and in all likelihood its example will be followed by other parishes and eparchies, compromising the dominant role of Moscow and nullifying the long-term efforts of the Patriarchate to obtain the adhesion of the foreign Orthodox communities to the jurisdiction of Moscow and so their abandonment of the canonical link with Constantinople.

The extremely firm position taken by Metropolitan Onufrij is shared by Metropolitan Epifanij (Dumenko), Metropolitan of Kyiv and of all of Ukraine, who leads the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church, born out of the Unification Council of 15 December 2018 and recognized by Constantinople. Epifanij declared: «As primate I appeal to the Russian assassins: do not aggravate your crimes by destroying the shrines, especially because you hypocritically justify yourselves as defenders of the Church». And again: «I appeal to the international community and, in particular, to religious leaders: raise your voice against this crime of Russia. With words and actions, do everything possible to stop the bombing». «Loudly ask Russia and the Moscow Patriarchate to put an end to these barbaric bombings. Do not hide behind generic desires for peace but speak the Truth as our Lord has taught us». In an interview with Greek TV, Metropolitan Epifanij declared that he had suffered three attacks and that he was in fifth place on the list of people to be killed in Ukraine, and speaking to the German Broadcaster Deutsche Welle, he accused Patriarch Kirill of behaving like Putin.

Svyatoslav Shevchuk, major archbishop of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, which is the Eastern Rite Catholic Church with the largest number of followers spread over all the continents, did not hesitate to condemn the invasion of Ukraine in the strongest terms, expressing concern that «a humanitarian catastrophe is beginning» in Ukrainian cities that have been surrounded by Russian forces.
The support given by Patriarch Kirill to the Russian aggression has greatly isolated him in the Orthodox world: for example, the Serbian Orthodox Church, traditionally a friend of Moscow, has declared that it is sending aid to Metropolitan Onufrij; Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria and all of Africa said: «Putin thinks he is the emperor of our times. Power can get you drunk. And the great authoritarian power blinds the eyes, and you forget that you are human. It is not possible to cross oneself, to pray to God, and at the same time to kill children and people».

The patriarchs of the Orthodox Churches of Serbia, Romania and Georgia also asked Kirill to intercede with Putin to put an end to the war in Ukraine. Even the Russian priests and deacons of the Moscow Patriarchate do not hesitate to expose themselves in the criticism of Kirill, just consider that over three hundred of them have signed an appeal against what the Russian authorities do not call war but «special military operation» (special’naja voennja operacija), even if it must be said that a part of the clergy, especially the monastic one, unconditionally approves the invasion of Ukraine. The criticisms of the Patriarch formulated by the clergy are flanked by authoritative exponents of the laity, such as Sergej Čapnin, former editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate and deputy director of the Patriarchate publishing house, who in an articulated intervention in the periodical «Dary» analyses the speeches of the patriarch highlighting the guilty silences and contradictions and concludes with bitterness: «Today it is completely clear: Patriarch Kirill is not ready to defend his flock – neither the Ukrainian people nor the Russian people – against the aggressive Putin regime. Human suffering is not one of his priorities. The Patriarch’s intercession with the holders of power remains only in the history books».

In protest the war, the Metropolitan of Ternopil, Sergij Genšic’kyj, once very devoted to Moscow, returned to Putin the Order of Friendship conferred on him ten years ago.

Protests against the invasion of Ukraine took place in many cities of the Russian Federation and thousands of citizens were arrested; the demonstrations continue even after the Duma, meeting in an extraordinary plenary session on 4 March , unanimously approved the introduction into the Criminal Code of the Federation a new type of crime Public dissemination of notoriously false information on the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (art. 207.3) which provides for very severe fines and imprisonment of up to fifteen years in the event that such behaviour has caused serious consequences (tjažkie posledstvija).

The well-known proto-deacon Andrei Kuraev has spoken out against the war, while the elderly theologian Alexei Osipov, former professor at the Moscow theological seminary, unconditionally approves the special military operation.

For his part, on February 27, Patriarch Kirill, in the Cathedral of Christ the Savioor, where he has rarely appeared in recent times, said: «God forbid that a terrible line is found between Russia and Ukraine, stained by the blood of brothers. We must not let dark and hostile external forces deride us. We must protect our common historical homeland from all those external actions that can destroy this unity».

Expressing themselves in support of the patriarch are, among others, Tikhon (Ševkunov), Metropolitan of Pskov and spiritual father of Putin, and Pitirim (Voločkov), archbishop of Syktyvkar. Even the primate of the Russian Orthodox Church of Old Believers, Metropolitan Kornilyj (Titov), supports and approves the actions of «our army», stating that in Ukraine people have been killed «just because they think and speak Russian […] The Slavic peoples no longer want to put up with this illegality», he continued, inviting the Ukrainians to lay down their arms and to «stop the genocide and madness».

Much less surprising are the statements made by some members of the clergy. An example is the homily of the protoierej Artemij Vladimirov, a well-known preacher with a calm and persuasive voice and a member of the patriarchal council for family problems and the defence of motherhood. The protoierej refers to «fascists, cannibals, monsters of the human race» who «exercise their tyranny in brotherly Ukraine», over «raped girls and living compatriots, from whom their organs have been extracted and sent to Europe […] So we will prepare for the beginning of Great Lent and for a special Easter, as we believe, of 2022, when all of Great, Small and White Russia will be able to march from Vladivostok to Kaliningrad as a single immortal regiment […] We hope that in near future Moldova, Kazakhstan, the unfortunate Ukraine will join us, Georgia is on its way. Well, you can imagine what will happen to the Baltic states which today constitute the transhipment base for the extermination of the Slavs».

To the chorus of those who approve Putin’s policy and the invasion are added the lay representatives of the establishment such as, for example, the rectors of Russian universities, who, moreover, do not have access to free information as a result of the news being monopolised by government forces and by the introduction of censorship.
In the sermon on Forgiveness Sunday (March 6), the last Sunday before the beginning of Lent, Kirill addressed the theme of the war in Ukraine, which he sees as a struggle against the promotion of lifestyles that conflict with Christian tradition., «a struggle that does not have a physical meaning, but a metaphysical one», explaining that the populations of Donbass in particular are undergoing the imposition of a Western culture that «violates the law of God»: and concluding with the words: «To enter the club of those countries it is necessary to organize a gay pride parade». This statement, at the very least inappropriate and surprising, has aroused not only bewilderment but also the irritated reaction of the Western world. In reality, that of Kirill is a quote from the aforementioned letter that the monk Filofej of Pskov in the fifteenth century sent to the Grand Prince of Moscow to tell him that the Tsar must defend the Church, Russia and the whole world from three dangers: first of all heresy, including Roman Catholicism, then the danger of the invasion of the Saracens, that is, of the Muslims, who took Constantinople, and finally sodomy, which was considered the highest expression of immorality. Citing gay pride, therefore, the patriarch of Moscow certainly wanted to provoke the contemporary Western mentality, but above all to reaffirm what is believed to be the historical mission of Russia and the Russian Church, namely, to save the world from moral degradation and heresy. In his sermon, the patriarch invites us to pray «for all those who fight today, who shed blood, who suffer, so that they too may have the joy of the resurrection in peace and serenity», a phrase referring only to the Donbass separatists.

During the meeting with Archbishop Giovanni D’Aniello, apostolic nuncio to the Russian Federation, Patriarch Kirill claimed his position of non-disapproval of the war and indirectly criticized the other Orthodox Churches that have taken a position of condemnation towards of Moscow and declared: «We are trying to take a position of peacekeeping, even in the face of existing conflicts, because the Church cannot participate in the conflict, it can only be a peacemaking force».  «Churches must never take part in conflicts, but be peacemakers»: with his attitude, Kirill openly supports Putin’s ideas.

From various sides, including the Conference of European Churches, Kirill has been urged to speak out against the invasion of Ukraine and to help end the conflict and restore peace, but the patriarch refuses to take a position on the events of the war and limits himself to remind people in official speeches of the principle of Russkij mir, that is, the unity of Russia and Ukraine. Before the invasion, at the end of January, he reiterated previously stated concepts: «Ukraine is not on the periphery of our Church. We call Kiev the Mother of all Russian cities. Kiev is our Jerusalem. Russian orthodoxy starts there. It is impossible for us to abandon this historical and spiritual relationship». The Patriarch of Moscow defined those who fight against the historical unity of the two countries as «forces of evil» and added: «May the Lord protect the peoples who are part of the same space, that of the Russian Orthodox Church, from fratricidal warfare […]. A land which today Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, other tribes and other peoples are all part».

For Kirill, Ukraine is the canonical territory of the Church of Moscow and for this reason any claim to autonomy such as the recognition of the Ukrainian Church’s autocephaly is unacceptable as it removes Ukraine from the “Russkij mir”, ie the Russian world.

The denial of the ethno-cultural identity of Ukrainians and of Ukrainian statehood and the idea that the Russian Federation and Ukraine are to be considered as a single homeland being united by a sharing of faith appears clearly from the document Fundamentals of the social conception of the Russian Orthodox Church, which after having reaffirmed the principle of the harmony between State and Church, he dedicates the entire second chapter to the theme Church and Nation, in which the idea of ​​Orthodox patriotism is defined. The document states: «In all times the Church has exhorted her children to love the earthly homeland and not to spare their lives to defend it, should it be in danger […] Christian patriotism is manifested simultaneously towards the nation both as an ethnic community and as a community of citizens of the state. The Orthodox Christian is called to love his homeland, which has a territorial dimension, and his blood brothers who live all over the world. This love is one of the ways of carrying out God’s command of love thy neighbour, which includes love for one’s family, fellow countrymen and fellow citizens. The patriotism of the Orthodox Christian must be effective. It manifests itself in the defence of the homeland from the enemy, in work for the good of the homeland, in the concern for the organization of the life of the people and through participation in the government of the state. The Christian is called to safeguard and develop the national culture and the self-awareness of the people. The nation, whether civil or ethnic, when it is wholly or for the most part a single-denominational Orthodox community, can in a certain sense be considered as a single community of faith: an Orthodox nation».

It seems clear that Putin, in full harmony with the ecclesiastical leadership, intends to re-propose the ancient Tsarist and Soviet anti-Ukrainian legislation and to impose the Russification of Ukraine with violence and manu militari, in the undisguised aspiration to reconstitute the Russian-Soviet empire, to overcome the humiliation of its dissolution thirty years ago.

The Ukrainian resistance, determined to defend its freedom, the one sung in the national anthem, opposes Putin’s determination:

The glory of Ukraine is not yet dead, nor is her freedom, on us, young brothers, fate will smile again. / Our enemies will disappear, like dew in the sun, / and we too, brothers, will reign in our free country. / We will give body and soul for our freedom, / and we will show that we, brothers, are of Cossack stock.

The Cossack lemma (kazak in Russian and kozak in Ukrainian) derives from the Turkish word quazaq’, which means free man.

*Giovanni Codevilla taught Comparative Law and Religion at the University of Trieste. He is the author of several books on Russia and Soviet system. The most important work is the quadrilogy Storia della Russia e dei Paesi limitrofi: Chiesa e Impero,  Milan, Jaca Book 2016.

Photo caption: Fëdor Nikitič Romanov

Will Putin’s unfortunate war against Ukraine have the unexpected “side effect” of leading to the creation of a single autocephalous Church in the country?

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by Luigi Sandri*


    For three years there have been two Orthodox Churches in the country: the Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church (UOAC), linked to the patriarchate of Constantinople led by Bartholomew, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), linked to Moscow. The Russian patriarchate, led by Kirill, was absolutely opposed to the creation of the former and, after Bartholomew, in January 1919, gave the tomos of autocephaly, officially creating the UOAC, the Russian patriarch and his Synod cut the Eucharistic communion with Constantinople. That is, they proclaimed a schism with it.
    Then, on February 24, the starting date of what the Kremlin calls a “Special Military Operation”, Kirill said: “It is with deep pain in my heart that I feel the suffering of the people, caused by the events that are happening. As patriarch of all Russia and primate of the Church, whose flock is found in Russia, Ukraine and several other countries, I have deep compassion for all who have been affected by misfortune. I urge all parties to the conflict to do everything possible to avoid civilian casualties”.

But Onufriy, primate of the UOC, said on the same day: “Defending the sovereignty and integrity of Ukraine, we turn to the president of Russia and ask him to stop the fratricidal war immediately. The Ukrainian and Russian peoples arose from the baptismal fonts of the Dnieper and the war between these two peoples is the repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his brother out of jealousy. Such a war finds no justification either before God or before men”.
    Then an ecclesiologically important event occurred: starting from Sunday 6 March to today – 18 March, as I write – about fifteen metropolitans of the UOC (which is to say about ninety bishops) – in the Sunday celebration of the “divine liturgy”, that is the mass, they deliberately omitted Kirill’s name. Among them, Serafim of Ivano-Frankiv and Kolomyia, Antony of Khmelnitsky and Starokonstantinov, Theodory of Muchacevo, Agapet of Mogilev Podolsky and Chargorod, Eulogy of Sumy, Nicodim of Jitomir, Filarete of Leopoli and Galizia et Novograd-Kirynovsky and Novomirgorod. To understand the significance of this gesture, it is necessary to know that, in Orthodoxy, the memory of one’s patriarch, during the liturgy, is crucial; not doing so, in itself, is an act of schism.
   Dozens of parish priests of the UOC have also done so, but adding a crucial request to Onufriy: that of convening a “local council” (where representatives of both the priesthood and the faithful participate with the bishops) to proclaim the autocephaly of their Church. But in Ukraine there is already the UOAC! Will the Russian invasion that is ravaging Ukraine now cause all the Orthodox Churches in the country to unite into a single autocephalous Church? And who would be the point of reference? Constantinople with which Moscow is in a state of schism? Or what if Moscow finally condemns Putin’s war?
   It should be added that even metropolitans linked to the patriarchate of Moscow, but pastors of Russian Orthodox who live outside the homeland, have begun to publicly contest Kirill. Metropolitan Innokentzy of Vilnius and Lithuania declared: “The position of the Orthodox Church in Lithuania remains unchanged: we strongly condemn Russia’s war against Ukraine and pray to God for its swift end .. Patriarch Kirill and I have political views and different perceptions about current events. His political statements about the war express his personal opinion. We, in Lithuania, do not agree with it “.
    Metropolitan Jean of Dubna, archbishop of the Orthodox Churches of Russian tradition in Western Europe, wrote to Kirill on March 9 from Paris: “On behalf of all of our faithful I turn to Your Holiness to raise your voice as Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church against a monstrous and senseless war, and to intercede with the authorities of the Russian Federation so that this deadly conflict, that until recently seemed impossible between two nations and two peoples united by centuries of history and from their common faith in Christ, end as soon as possible “.
    Jean also disagrees with the anti-gay statements made three days earlier by Kirill, who took against Gay Pride, which wants to make the practice of homosexuality moral, prohibited, he underlined, by the law of God: “Your Holiness, in your homily on Forgiveness Sunday, delivered on March 6 in the patriarchal cathedral of Christ the Saviour, you intimate that you justify this cruel and deadly war of aggression [against Ukraine] as ‘a metaphysical fight‘ in the name ‘of the right to to be on the side of the light, on the side of God’s truth, of what the light of Christ and His Gospel reveals to us‘. With all the respect that is due to you, I must tell you that I cannot subscribe to such a reading of the Gospel”.
     Even within the Russian Church itself, at home, public dissent against the war is beginning to emerge. About 240 Russian priests and deacons, in early March, after describing the ongoing war as “fratricidal”, added: “We weep for the Calvary to which our brothers and sisters in Ukraine have been undeservedly subjected”.

Many heads of autocephalous national Orthodox Churches have asked for the immediate cessation of hostilities: above all Bartholomew, patriarch of Constantinople; the archbishop of Athens, Jeronimos II, and the Albanian primate, Anastasios of Tirana. The most cutting was the Romanian patriarchate, which defined Kirill’s attitude as “cynical” and “dishonourable”.
    There are also signs of strong dissent against Putin from civil society. Thousands of people were arrested in various cities, from St. Petersburg to Vladivostok, for publicly protesting against the war. But perhaps the most sensational fact is the explicit dissent of the Lomonosov University in Moscow, one of the most important in Russia. In a manifesto, dated March 5, and signed by more than seven thousand professors and students, it is stated:

   “We, the students, postgraduates, lecturers, staff and graduates of Russia’s oldest university, Lomonosov Moscow State University, categorically condemn the war our country has started in Ukraine.
Russia and our parents have given us a serious education, the foundation of which lies in the ability to critically evaluate what is happening around us, to weigh arguments, to listen to each other and to commit oneself to truth both scientific and humanistic. We know how to call things by their name and we cannot remain inert.
    The actions carried out by the Russian Federation, actions that its leadership defines as a “special military operation”, are war, and there is no room for euphemisms or excuses in this situation. War is violence, brutality, death, loss of loved ones, helplessness and fear that cannot be justified by any purpose. War is the most brutal act of inhumanity, which, as we have learned within the walls of schools and universities, must never be repeated. The values of the absoluteness of human life, humanism, diplomacy and the peaceful resolution of differences that we learned in university were trampled and thrown away in an instant when Russia treacherously invaded Ukraine. The lives of millions of Ukrainians have been under constant threat since Russian military forces invaded Ukraine.
    We express our support for the people of Ukraine and categorically condemn the war that Russia has started against the Ukrainians.
    As graduates of the oldest Russian university, we know that the losses suffered in six days of bloody war, mainly human, but also social, economic and cultural, are irreparable. We also know that the war is a humanitarian disaster, but we cannot imagine the depth of the wound that we as the Russian people are inflicting on the Ukrainian people and on ourselves right now.
   We demand that the Russian leadership immediately cease the fire, leave the territory of the sovereign state of Ukraine and put an end to this shameful war.
   We call on all citizens of Russia who care about its future to join the peace movement. We are against the war!“

*”Confronti” Editorial Board

Sources, especially:
http://www.ortodoxie.com, http://www.patriarchia.ru, http://www.mospat.ru

Religious Diplomacy: How to Integrate Religious Engagement into International Relations

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by Giancarlo Anello*

Contemporary international law is the law in force today, which began in the aftermath of the Second World War, most notably with the adoption of the UN Charter as the outcome of the S. Francisco Conference on June, 26th 1945. In the Charter, religion is mentioned as a reason of possible discrimination – along with some other elements, like race, sex, language – given that international community is called to assist the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms (articles 13, 55, and 76). Since that time international law has changed, after some events like the spread and collapse of communism, the development of International Organizations, decolonization and the rise of the rights of peoples to self-determination, the international recognition of human rights, the late globalization. Accordingly, religion became the ground of a specific position within the human rights’ discourse. The grounding value of religion has been changing from time to time until the latest interpretation that considers religious freedom as a “special” right. The internationally distinguished Italian scholar Silvio Ferrari has explained the special nature of religious freedom asserting its “triadic” nature: while freedom of conscience or expression are grounded on a bilateral relationship, the relationship between the individual and the State, the right to freedom of religion or belief has a more complex structure as it lies at the triangulation point where the individual, the faith community and the State converge. The relationships between individual, faith community and political power have been different depending on the historical periods. Sometimes the faith community has prevailed and the political power has regulated freedom of religion or belief according to the tenets of a religion, normally the majority religion in the country. Sometimes the political authority has prevailed and has dictated its own discipline of freedom of religion or belief to which the faith communities have had to adapt. Rarely, however, have individuals been able to assert freedom of religion or belief as their own right, with an autonomous foundation independent from the law of the State or faith community. For this reason, it is possible to count more and more provisions of recent international legislations promoting the idea of a major engagement of religious actors into international relations and diplomacy[1].

The action of religious leaders can integrate the area of diplomacy as a traditional area of international law. Recent documents coming from international organizations show the direction for integrating religious engagement into diplomacy. But in terms of strengthening multilateral diplomacy a more comprehensive methodology is required. Some academics are conducting specific researches in this direction. Mention should be made to Mandaville and Silvestri who, after surveying a number of the challenges to integrating religious engagement into statecraft – from a bias of secularism in diplomacy, to religious freedom protections, to institutional constraints – describe a new approach that includes:

  • moving away from a model whereby religion is viewed as being relevant only to certain specialized functions such as the advancement of international religious freedom;
  • departing from approaches to engagement with religious leaders and faith-based organizations that view those entities as having a limited role around a very limited set of policy issues (e.g. peacemaking, development, humanitarian disasters);
  • getting beyond the all-too common practice of using “religion” as a shorthand or euphemism for Islam;
  • recognizing the central importance of religion as a societal force around the world;
  • making the case that awareness of and engagement with religious actors can play a constructive role in advancing even policy issues that, on the face of it, seemingly have little to do with religion, faith, or spiritual matters;
  • and, lastly, while advocating for the importance of religion as a force in world affairs, also avoiding over-stating the importance of religion.

Latter point introduces more specific questions: what are the type of religious actors to engage? Isn’t too risky to open the door of diplomacy to radical group and fundamentalists? Pope Francis addresses them in a section of the mentioned encyclical letter “Fratelli tutti”. The section is dedicated to “social dialogue for a new culture” (FT, Chapters 199 ff.). The Pope explains that such a dialogue must have specific characteristics and methodology, be enriched and illumined by “clear thinking, rational arguments, a variety of perspectives and the contribution of different fields of knowledge and points of view”. But it must also make space for the conviction that “it is possible to arrive at certain fundamental truths always to be upheld”. “Acknowledging the existence of certain enduring values, however demanding it may be to discern them”, he adds, “makes for a robust and solid social ethics” (FT, Chapter 213).
Thus, it is obvious that irreconcilably violent extremists cannot be involved in inter-religious or intra-religious diplomacy but the approach that distinguish only between good and bad religious leaders overlooks the importance of the actors that are in the middle[2]. Many communities and leaders can be interested in entering the dialogue without compulsion, out of sectarian interests or a theological position, but just for improving the conditions of the daily life of their communities. Such players are exactly the actors to engage in the diplomatic processes.

*Professor of “Religious Diplomacy” at the University of Parma

[1] A model is the “Report of United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief”, United Nations General Assembly, UN Doc A/HRC/28/66, 29 December 2014, https://undocs.org/A/HRC/28/66, p. 22.

[2] R. Scott Appleby, Comprehending religion in Global affairs, in Petito, Daou, and Driessen, supra, p. 74.

References:
• Giancarlo Anello, Believers United. Religions in Dialogue Through the Law, Wolters Kruwer, in press (2022).
• Silvio Ferrari, Freedom of religion or Belied in International Law, in Andrea Benzo (ed.), From Freedom of Worship to Freedom of Religion or Belief. Fostering the Partnership between States, the International Community and Religious Institutions, Proceedings of the Conference Italian Cultural Institute – Cairo, 18 February 2020, Embassy of Italy, Garden City-Cairo, 2020, p. 109-110.
• Pope Francis, Encyclical Letter, Fratelli Tutti, Citta del Vaticano, 3 October 2020, https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html
• Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson (eds.), Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994, p. 20 ff.
• Peter Mandaville and Sara Silvestri, Integrating religious engagement into diplomacy: challenges and opportunities, Issues in Governance Studies, 67, 2015, pp. 1-13.
• Philip Mc Donagh and others, On the Significance of Religion for Global Diplomacy, Routledge, 2021, p. 114 https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/42730

How the Moscow Patriarchate projects the Kremlin’s world geopolitics: margin notes to religious issues linked to the Ukrainian war

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by Vincenzo Pacillo*

1686 and 2018: keep in mind these dates if you want to fully understand why “the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is firmly linked to religious reasons” – as Lucian N. Leustean had it.

As to1686: in this year the synodal letter of the patriarch Dionysius IV of Constantinople gave the Moscow Patriarchate the right to ordain the Metropolitan of Kiev. Although Kiev is historically known as ‘the cradle of Eastern Christianity’, it lost its centrality following the division of Russia into districts and the Mongol invasion . Back to 1325, the metropolitan office was then moved to Moscow, while the Orthodox center of Moscow obtained autocephaly in 1448, thus gaining independence from Constantinople. Since these events happened just before the fall of Byzantium, Moscow consequently began to claim the right to be called “The Third Rome”. As stated in patriarch Dionysius’s synodal letter, the rebuilt metropolis of Kiev finally accepted Moscow supremacy in 1686. This notwithstanding, Moscow should theoretically have obeyed Constantinople and therefore practiced its religious rites according to the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Be that as it may, Moscow gave its own interpretation of the synodal letter – an official Orthodox document addressing questions of doctrine, administration or application – so as to gain more and more independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople. As a result of this, Moscow finally carved ‘a right to supremacy over Kiev’ out of the synodal letter. 

Against this background, in 2017 Ukraine had three active Orthodox churches on its territory.The first was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.The second was the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. Founded in 1992, the latter was declared “schismatic” by the Moscow Patriarchate and thus not recognized by the other Orthodox churches. Finally, worth mentioning is the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, founded in 1917 by Ukrainians in exile. Having returned to Ukraine territory after independence, unsurprisingly the latter is the smallest of the three churches mentioned so far and its parishes are still scattered throughout western Ukraine.

Fast forward to 2018: the year in which the then Ukrainian president, Poroshenko, appealed to the patriarch of Constantinople to grant autocephaly to Ukrainian Orthodoxy. On the whole, such an attempt to obtain ecclesiastical independence within Orthodoxy is, at its core, an internal affair of the church. However, as was the case with previous calls for independence by other National Orthodox Churches, this request soon became a strictly political issue. This is all the more true if one considers the geopolitical situation of Ukraine and its relationship with Russia.

In January 2019, Ukrainian Orthodoxy received the so-called tomos from the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, meaning that the latter granted autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kiev Patriarchate. This decision triggered a deep crisis in Orthodoxy and a conflict between Constantinople and Moscow arose immediately afterwards. As such, by condemning the actions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Russian Orthodox Church accused the Patriarchate of Constantinople of invading its “canonical field”. Here is why from that moment on the Patriarch of Moscow, Kirill, severed his ties with Patriarchate of Constantinople and began to support the Russian separatists forces in Donbas. 

During the Battle of Ilovaisk, the bloodiest fight of the war, Kirill admonished the Ukrainian “Uniates and Schismatics” for fighting “their Orthodox brothers” in the ranks of the separatists and their support forces.

Stated as simply as possible, this should be taken to mean that Patriarch Kirill, and by extension, the Russian Orthodox Church, have supported Russian state narratives about the need to unite the Russian and Ukrainian people under the Russian flag. From this vantage point, the war against Ukraine can therefore also be seen as a war about a kind of “schismatic” power.

A “schismatic power” that, as Kirill pointed out in his sermon of 6 March, however has not prevented certain ‘ungodly’ and ‘sinful’ events, such as gay pride parades, from spreading across the country. With these words, Kirill de facto gave a theologically-oriented reading to resist the decadence and moral relativism shown in places like Kyiv, as well as to justify a military intervention to restore the ‘real’ values on which Orthodoxy rests.

In conclusion, and borrowing from Lucian N. Leustean, this is how “the Moscow Patriarchate projects the Kremlin’s world geopolitics” both in Ukraine and in other territories.

A sinistre projection that seems to be taking the form of a ‘caesaropapist’ turn towards a new culture war.

*Full Professor in Law and Religion at University of Modena and Reggio Emilia

Bibliography: 

Il fattore religioso nella lotta russo-ucraina

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di Antonello De Oto*

Kiev assediata e accerchiata. Bombardata a ritmo continuo con missili e aerei. Sebbene militarmente inferiore l’Ucraina resiste. Perché la libertà è un bene preziosissimo. E la libertà religiosa ne è una grande parte. Perché meglio morire combattendo che perire lentamente ogni giorno sotto il giogo dell’occupante. Le donne ucraine cantano nei corridoi sotterranei della Metro “Šče ne vmerla Ukraïny” l’inno nazionale che dice testualmente: “L’Ucraina non è ancora morta, né la sua gloria né la sua libertà”.

E forse tutto questo lo zar Putin non lo aveva previsto. Perlomeno non in questi termini. Ma avrebbe dovuto, perché in questo conflitto, figlio di un’aggressione militare in piena violazione del diritto internazionale vigente -che pone indietro l’orologio della storia al 1 settembre 1939 – a complicare ancor di più la situazione c’è il fattore identitario di cui l’elemento religioso risulta essere la parte più antica e corposa.
La Russia, già dai tempi di Alessandro I, aveva iniziato i tentativi di unire la chiesa greco-cattolica all’Ortodossia ma solo con lo Zar Nicola I vi è una svolta nella politica ecclesiastica. Come scrive Giovanni Codevilla nel suo “La Russia Imperiale” (Jaca Book) “…il 22 dicembre 1827 il secondo Dipartimento del Collegio ecclesiastico delibera di liquidare una parte dei monasteri uniati…”.

La chiesa ortodossa russa invece assume lo stato di autocefalia nel 1448 e nel 1589 diviene Patriarcato, con l’influenza su tutta l’area, compresa l’Ucraina i cui vescovi tra Mosca e Roma, in maniera consistente, scelgono la seconda: sono le chiese di rito orientale in comunione con la chiesa cattolica, i c.d. uniati oggi a sostegno del nazionalismo ucraino. Un puzzle religioso di confine che sviluppa da sempre conflittualità. Un doppio confine in buona sostanza: politico e religioso.

La dichiarazione firmata a Cuba nel 2016 da papa Francesco e dal patriarca di mosca, Kirill si occupa della tensione fra le Chiese ortodosse e quelle cattoliche e la posizione di ciascuna nei confronti della Russia e dello scontro in atto da molto tempo. L’invito a «imparare a vivere assieme», ad «astenersi dal partecipare allo scontro» civile e militare e a superare lo scisma fra gli ortodossi «sulla base delle norme canoniche esistenti», è stata allora percepita come una sorta di collateralismo con le tesi della Chiesa ortodossa russa e degli interessi di quella nazione. La reazione nelle Chiese cattoliche nei paesi ortodossi fu molto critica e l’arcivescovo maggiore dei greco-cattolici ucraini, mons. Sviatoslav Shevchuk all’epoca gridò al tradimento di Roma a cui il papa rispose dopo poco direttamente nel viaggio di ritorno dal Messico distinguendo il piano dogmatico da quello ecclesiale. L’incontro fra papa Francesco e i vescovi ucraini ha in seguito molto smussato le divergenze evidenziando le gravi tensioni affrontate da Kirill per aver accettato all’epoca l’incontro con Papa Francesco.

Fatiche della pace. Fatiche della storia che vede rapporti complicatissimi tra le Chiese sulle rive del Dniepr, difficoltà che riemergono costantemente con giudizi divergenti sulla storia anche recente, come lo pseudo-sinodo di Leopoli (8-10 marzo 1946) in cui si decise la forzata riunificazione della Chiesa greco-cattolica ucraina all’ortodossia russa.

Gli storici non nutrono dubbio alcuno sul fatto che il sinodo di Lviv abbia rappresentato una messa in scena facendo della Chiesa greco-cattolica la principale vittima, ma al tempo stesso una vitale forza di opposizione nel mondo sovietico. E arriviamo ad oggi. Per vincere Putin è disposto a rischiare tutto. Lo “scalpo” ucraino non rappresenta solo una vittoria militare e politica ma anche la definitiva sistemazione di un problema religioso ed identitario.
Perciò nell’attacco militare a Kiev, la Russia odierna utilizza per la prima volta nuovi orribili tecnologie militari come ad esempio “Terminator Tank”. L’assedio ai centri urbani, per piegare il governo attuale, è l’obiettivo dei carri armati “hi tech” in dotazione alle truppe assieme alle armi termobariche atte a determinare una dirompente onda di pressione che distrugge gli organi interni di chi è nelle vicinanze.

Ma tutta questa nuova tecnologia è questa voglia di vincere ad ogni costo sembra scontrarsi con una logistica dell’esercito russo che non sta rivelandosi nel pantano ucraino all’altezza delle previsioni. La sinfonia dei poteri principio fondativo che governa il mondo Russo e il consenso espresso o sotterraneo dell’ortodossia ad ogni impresa imperiale di ri-costruzione della grande madre Russia potrebbe definitivamente incrinarsi se l’invasione dell’Ucraina non portasse a breve alla capitolazione del Paese, finendo solo per inasprire rapporti politici e religiosi già pessimi e alimentando la narrazione separatista e nazionalista degli uniati. E Mosca, la terza Roma, non può permetterlo. l’Ucraina è per il patriarcato di Mosca ancora un grande bacino di sacerdoti, di chiese e di fedeli.

II contributo è stato pubblicato su Formiche.net al seguente link

*Professore associato di Diritto ecclesiastico presso l’Università di Bologna.

Le guerre non scoppiano da sole

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di Pierluigi Consorti*

La decisione di ricorrere all’uso della forza armata per gestire un conflitto è sempre il frutto di pensieri violenti che si traducono in azioni violente. Quando anche una sola parte implicata in un conflitto decide di ricorrere alla forza armata, trascina le altre nella spirale della violenza armata coinvolgendo pure quelli che non sono direttamente interessati. La spirale dei pensieri violenti avvolge la scena e sembra che non si possa fare altro che usare la violenza, tanto per chi aggredisce quanto per chi si difende. Questo schema reattivo è perverso, irrazionale, e tuttavia appare ineluttabile, in quanto siamo abituati a considerare la violenza un elemento fisiologico della vita umana e sociale. L’idea di trasformare un conflitto in guerra fa parte della nostra storia; anche se sappiamo che nessuna guerra risolve davvero un conflitto. La guerra apparentemente genera vincitori e vinti, ma in realtà tutti perdono.

Ciononostante, la guerra fa parte della nostra mentalità: accettiamo con facilità di piegarci alle sue logiche e alle sue leggi. Combattere con le armi della distruzione appare un’opzione possibile. Per questo motivo i pacifisti che vogliono cancellare la guerra dalla storia sono considerati schiavi di un’utopia irrealistica: sappiamo tutti e tutte molto bene quanto sia difficile cancellare la violenza dalla mente degli uomini e delle donne.

Come pacifisti siamo anche accusati di mancare di coraggio, di non voler distinguere l’aggressore dall’aggredito e di restare in una comoda posizione neutrale, inefficace se non dannosa. A questo proposito non possiamo non ricordare che, in ogni conflitto, la ragione e il torto non dipendono da analisi esterne, fossero anche le più complete e sofisticate, ma dalla percezione della realtà che ciascuno vive in modo complesso e sempre dal proprio punto di vista. Ogni mediatore che entra in un conflitto altrui sa bene che tutte le parti del conflitto hanno le proprie ragioni. Pensare di gestire un conflitto distribuendo i torti e le ragioni non aiuta a gestirlo. Se si vuole impedire che il conflitto diventi una guerra e che questa distrugga tutto, bisogna impedire che i pensieri e le azioni violente prendano il sopravvento. Quando questo avviene e si comincia a usare la forza armata, il motivo del conflitto passa in secondo piano e l’attenzione si concentra sulle strategie, anche violente, che possono portare all’eliminazione dell’altro. Sia da parte di chi aggredisce che di chi si difende.

La violenza chiama violenza e crea inevitabilmente vittime innocenti. La responsabilità di ciascuna vittima si divide in parti uguali fra chi ha sparato l’ultimo colpo, quello fatale, e chi ha inviato quel soldato a sparare e chi ha costruito l’arma che ha sparato, chi l’ha venduta, progettata e chi non è stato capace di lavorare perché i pensieri violenti e le azioni violente non fossero considerati ineluttabili.

La guerra che si combatte in Ucraina sembra scoppiata tre giorni fa, quando le forze armate russe hanno cominciato l’invasione dell’intero territorio nemico. Un po’ tutti siamo impegnati a distribuire le responsabilità, a immaginare strategie di difesa, che mettono in conto la possibilità di uccidere, con le armi in senso stretto, o quelle dell’economia. Combattere armi in pugno sembra una scelta possibile, persino buona e magari la migliore.

Di fronte a questo scenario di violenza l’unica risposta realistica è quella di far tacere immediatamente le armi. Senza indugio e senza distinguo. Tanto gli aggressori quanto gli aggrediti possono decidere di gettare le armi. Questa scelta non è solo nelle mani dei capi delle Nazioni, ma anche in quelle di ciascuno e ciascuna delle persone armate. È venuto il momento di scegliere se essere colpevoli o innocenti.

I capi delle Nazioni hanno responsabilità maggiori, ma anche noi, gli ultimi, possiamo mostrare di avere un potere. L’India si è liberata del dominio coloniale senza uccidere neanche un colonizzatore. Il muro di Berlino è stato abbattuto senza uccidere nessuno. I pensieri e le azioni nonviolente hanno dimostrato di essere efficaci, anche se sono stati offuscati dalla storia successiva. Possiamo tornare sui nostri passi.

L’Europa avverte di essere in guerra perché la Russia ha invaso l’Ucraina, ma eravamo già in guerra: in Libia, in Siria, in Africa, in America del Sud, e in molti altri luoghi in cui la violenza detta le condizioni di vita. Abbiamo ignorato le guerre, e i violenti ne hanno approfittato per armarsi e alzare il prezzo della pace possibile.

Se le guerre non scoppiano da sole, nemmeno la pace scoppia da sola. Se la guerra è l’esito di un’escalazione violenta, la pace di una lenta costruzione pacifica. Quando un conflitto si è già trasformato in guerra, le azioni di pace sono certamente più difficili; ma questo è pure il momento in cui c’è più bisogno di pace. Ci siamo tanto esercitati a combattere, che facciamo fatica a ricordare che fare la pace dipende da ciascuno di noi. Il disarmo comincia dal basso. Diamo un’opportunità alla pace cominciando da noi. Facciamo in modo che pensieri e gesti di pace condizionino le scelte dei potenti. Costringiamo i capi delle Nazioni a scegliere la pace. Disarmiamoci, non aggrediamo e non difendiamoci aggredendo.

Non è una cosa facile, né immediata. Siamo realisti e sappiamo di non essere attrezzati per fare la pace. Ma sappiamo anche che se c’è qualcosa per cui vale la pena vivere, e morire, quella è la pace. Se disarmiamo i conflitti, possiamo far scoppiare la pace.

Il contributo è stato pubblicato in Scienze & Pace Magazine, a cura del Centro interdisciplinare Scienze per la Pace dell’università di Pisa

*Professore ordinario di Diritto e religione all’Università di Pisa e presidente dell’Associazione dei docenti universitari della disciplina giuridica del fenomeno religioso